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Аннотация: Человек, принадлежа к млекопитающим, обладает как разнообразными 
способами информационного взаимодействия, свойственными животным этого класса, так 
и специфическими, а именно – высоким уровнем абстрактного мышления, языками и 
беспрецедентной социальной активностью, результатом которой является создание 
культур. Человек выделяется поразительным умением координировать свои действия с 
другими людьми, и существование человеческих сообществ зависит от разделения 
когнитивных усилий между их членами, от распределенности познания. В статье 
выдвигается тезис о том, что социально распределенные когниции человека являются 
результатом развития биологически распределенных когниций, которые 
эволюционировали параллельно с развитием коммуникативных форм социального 
взаимодействия. Биосемиотический подход описывает человека как очень сложную 
динамическую систему, вовлеченную в непрерывную многоаспектную коммуникативную 
деятельность. Вместе с тем, многие аналогичные информационные процессы 
осуществляют все живые системы, что позволяет сделать вывод о том, что низший уровень 
абстрактного мышления вполне мог сформироваться в рамках пространственного 
мышления, доминирующего в режиме коммуникативного взаимодействия со средой on-
line. Выдвигается предположение, что впоследствии данный первоначальный уровень 
абстракции смог достичь высокого порядка у человека благодаря возникшим способам 
коммуникации off-line. Таким образом, возникновение высокого абстрактного уровня 
мышления и широкой семиотической компетенции у человека явилось результатом 
принципа дополнительности биологически и социально распределенных когниции и 
коммуникации. История человеческой цивилизации свидетельствует о дальнейшем 
усилении позиций off-line коммуникации. Именно сдвиг в сторону информационного 
обмена off-line способствовал беспрецедентной социальной кооперации людей благодаря 
распределению когнитивно-коммуникативных процессов среди членов социальных групп 
независимо от ситуации «здесь и сейчас».  
Ключевые слова: эволюция; абстрактное мышление; пространственная когниция; 
абстрактное мышление низшего и высшего уровня; on- and off-line коммуникация; 
распределенное познание и коммуникация; происхождение языка 
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Abstract. Being mammals, humans both share with other animals varied forms of information 
exchange typical for that class and have something that makes them different, i.e. higher-order 
thinking, languages and unprecedented social activity resulting in a great diversity of cultures. People 
are particularly skilled in coordinating their activities, human communities rely on mind-sharing that is 
realized through distributed cognition. It is argued in the paper that human species’ socially distributed 
cognition is an extension to their biologically distributed cognition both being inseparable from 
distributed communicative interactions. From the biosemiotic perspective, humans can be described as 
very complex dynamic living systems that are continuously involved in multifaceted communicative 
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activity but so are all living systems, and lower-level mental abstraction could have evolved in terms 
of spatial cognition employed in on-line communicative interaction with the environment. It is 
proposed that that initial level of mental abstraction could then advance into higher-order thinking 
when humans developed communication off-line. Thus human semiotic mind specificity became 
possible due to biological and social distributed cognition and communication complementarity. The 
recorded history of mankind gives evidence that the focus on the off-line communication has been 
increasingly rising ever since. The shift from on-line to off-line interaction ensured the unparalleled 
social cooperation due to the distribution of cognitive processes across the members of a social group 
independently of 'here and now'. 
Key words: evolution; mental abstraction; spatial cognition; lower-order and higher-order mental 
abstraction; on- and off-line communication; distributed cognition and communication; language 
origin. 
 
Introduction 
Specificity of human intelligence is usually 
equalized with the exceptional level of abstract 
thinking it possesses – the ability to perform different 
mental operations in situations where the schemes 
and images that are voluntarily retrieved and operated 
upon in the mind are not directly connected to the 
structure of the moment. That level of mental activity 
is not necessarily activated under the pressure of 
some urgent need in the circumstances of ‘here and 
now’ but is initiated by the individual himself for 
purposes quite often not stipulated by the survival. 
Human cultures consist of a great number of objects 
of art that are created for the sake of art and do not 
ensure the entire species biological continual 
existence. Nevertheless, that capacity of extreme 
abstract thinking has not come out of the blue.  
There is a stable tendency in cognitive 
linguistics and psychology to explain this special 
human power in mental abstractness by language 
capacity innateness (Noam Chomsky’s Theory of 
Universal Grammar (1965) and Eric Lenneberg’s 
Critical Period Theory (1967), later developed by 
Stephen Pinker into language instinct (1994)). The 
use of languages that are unmotivated symbols and 
rely on individual’s ability to memorize huge 
amounts of words and structures demands particular 
mental skills. Thus the conclusion about language 
innateness seems to lie on the surface as, judging by 
their behavior in natural environments, none of other 
biological species demonstrate anything similar to 
human verbal communication and none have ever 
approached humans in creating anything similar to 
their cultures. Language extreme importance in 
men’s modern societies is unprecedented, and it 
would be absurd to deny the impact of language on 
the development of abstract cognitive abilities of an 
individual: in modern humans thinking and 
languaging have become practically inseparable.  
The omnipresence of language is the fact of 
contemporary human cognition and communication 
but not all individuals master that skill even 
nowadays. But what was the case at the dawn of 
human civilization? By taking the point that it was 
language that enabled mind to increase its potential in 
abstractions, we find ourselves trapped in the long 
known evolutionists’ problem: was it language that 
changed the mind or was it the mind that invented the 
language, the notorious “hen first – egg first” 
deadlock. Even admitting the crucial role of language 
in evolution, we have to agree that language in any 
form no matter how primitive (often referred to as 
protolanguage) demands considerable proficiency in 
cognitive computational mechanisms and verbal 
propositional thinking. In that case, it seems that the 
innate biological underpinnings of language 
acquisition are overemphasized. To conclude, the 
problem of mental abstraction emergence appears to 
be central in explaining how language evolved. 
In my opinion, the emphasis is to be made not 
on the language – mind co-evolution but on the 
semiotic capacity – mind co-evolution and 
development [1]. To show that this paper is based on 
several assumptions:1) cognition must not be 
separated from communication, and both should be 
treated as two components of the same phenomenon; 
2) cognition and communication are extremely 
diversified and distributed; they bear nonlinear traits; 
3) high-order mental abstraction is not an 
exceptionally human prerogative, and there is 
continuity across species in biological and social 
cognition; 4) language is a social phenomenon, not a 
biological one; it is only one the plethora of codes 
used in human cultures; 5) human specificity 
emerged when early Homo made preference for off-
line communication.  
 
Concrete and Abstract Semantics Paradox 
High-order mental abstraction can be explained 
by the natural evolutionary development of 
concrete/abstract thinking mutuality. Most probably, 
human abstract finesse developed from the initial 
level of abstract mental operations that make possible 
concrete / practical thinking not only in humans but 
animals as well.  
Extended research on brain asymmetry revealed 
neuroanatomical differences between the left and 
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right hemispheres that are responsible for 
lateralization of brain functions. That discovery gave 
rise to several dual-processing theories of the mind: 
“Dual-process theories have taken on various forms 
(e.g., see Evans, 2008 for a review). Nevertheless, 
there are some common features. First, these theories 
tend to explain the working of the human mind in 
terms of two qualitatively distinct cognitive systems, 
and are referred to as type 1/type 2 (Goodwin & 
Wason, 1972), System 1/System 2 (Stanovich, 1999), 
or intuitive/deliberative (Kahneman, 2003). 
Moreover, these two kinds of cognitive systems tend 
to be differentiated along the following dichotomies: 
unconscious/conscious, fast/slow, 
automatic/controlled, emotional/rational, 
intuitive/rule-based, etc.” [22, p. 1673].  
Complexity of mental processing allows 
postulating other types of dichotomies, including the 
opposition concrete / abstract which can be derived 
from the Dual-Coding Theory (DTC) developed by 
Alan Paivio in the 1970s [19; 20] according to which 
both visual and verbal inputs of information are 
processed differently. Two opposing cognitive systems 
are responsible for internalization and transformation of 
the incoming data: image-holistic that operates percepts 
converting them into representations in a form of 
mental analogue codes; and verbal-propositional that 
deals with symbolic mental codes: “The systems are 
assumed to be composed of internal representational 
units, called logogens and imagens, that are activated 
when one recognizes, manipulates, of just thinks about 
words or things. The representations are modality-
specific, so that we have different logogens and 
imagens corresponding to the visual, auditory, and 
haptic (feel), and motor properties of language and 
objects. The representations are connected to sensory 
input and response output systems as well as to each 
other so that they can function independently or 
cooperatively to mediate nonverbal and verbal behavior. 
The representational activity may or may not be 
experienced consciously as imagery and inner speech” 
[19, p. 3].  
Imagens are mental constructs that accumulate 
information about objects of reality in analogue 
forms, i.e. images are similar to natural objects and 
keep in memory their holistic parts, shapes, colours, 
etc. Imagens are the result of the entire body 
interaction in the environment in the real time mode, 
and the multiple channels of perception reflects the 
fragments of reality in their integrity at once. Thus 
imagens possess qualities of continuity.  
Logogens are discreet units, rely on unmotivated 
language symbols and operate sequentially. To create 
a coherent utterance a speaker selects the necessary 
concepts, organizes them in a certain form of thought 
then encodes them by words in a syntactically 
appropriate sequence in a sentence. Both imagens 
and logogens are interconnected, and the processing 
of information can be interpreted in terms of the 
embodied natural translation that mind performs 
continually [11]. 
Concrete / abstract thinking dichotomy helps to 
better understand the two aforementioned cognitive 
processing systems and explain how it happened that 
in their co-evolution the latter became dominant in 
human mind.  
Though definite criteria demarcating higher 
animals’ and humans’ thinking have not been given 
yet, it is repeatedly stressed that only people have a 
quality of abstract / higher-order, or conceptual [17] / 
off-line thinking [4]. Both socio-cultural and 
biological theories of intelligence specify human 
intellectual uniqueness according to the ability to 
perform mental operations in an abstract mode. 
Unfortunately, the idea of the abstraction is treated in 
modern science ambiguously. A couple of definitions 
demonstrate that: 
“Abstract thinking is a high-level thought 
process. Someone who is thinking abstractly is 
considering a concept in a broad, general and non-
specific way. Abstract thinking is the opposite of 
concrete thinking” [27]. 
Or: “abstract thinking – the final, most complex 
stage in the development of cognitive thinking, in 
which thought is characterized by adaptability, 
flexibility, and the use of concepts and 
generalizations. Problem solving is accomplished by 
drawing logical conclusions from a set of 
observations, such as making hypotheses and testing 
them. This type of thinking is developed by 12 to 15 
years of age, usually after some degree of education. 
In psychiatry, many disorders are characterized by 
the inability to think abstractly” [18]. 
According to these definitions abstract thinking 
is the highest form of individual and cognitive 
development that only humans have acquired in the 
course of evolution, and it is always described as 
standing in contrast to concrete thinking which is 
believed to be easier to define. At least the same 
Mosby’s Medical Dictionary characterizes it as: “a 
stage in the development of the cognitive thought 
processes in the child. During this phase thought 
becomes increasingly logical and coherent so that the 
child is able to classify, sort, order, and organize 
facts while still being incapable of generalizing or 
dealing in abstractions [italicized by N.A.]. Problem 
solving is accomplished in a concrete, systematic 
fashion based on what is perceived, keeping to the 
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literal meaning of words, as in applying the word 
horse to a particular animal and not to horses in 
general. In Piaget’s classification this stage occurs 
between 7 and 11 years of age, is preceded by 
syncretic thinking, and is followed by abstract 
thinking”.  
Though I am skeptical about children’s inability 
to apply the word horse to horses in general before 
they are 7, the main idea is (or better say – seems to 
be) clear – practical everyday thinking is connected 
with familiar routine surroundings filled with 
trivial/concrete things that people manipulate 
mentally mostly in the automatic mode. Still concrete 
thinking is not defined as a positive concept with its 
own clearly identifiable traits, but is presented just as 
a stage on the way to abstract thinking acquisition. 
The reason for that is that a more careful observation 
shows the impossibility to separate the two. Gideon 
Rosen [24] states:  
“The abstract/concrete distinction has a curious 
status in contemporary philosophy. It is widely 
agreed that the distinction is of fundamental 
importance. But there is no standard account of how 
the distinction is to be explained. There is a great deal 
of agreement about how to classify certain paradigm 
cases. Thus it is universally acknowledged that 
numbers and the other objects of pure mathematics 
are abstract, whereas rocks and trees and human 
beings are concrete” [24].  
The last point is on the one hand sensible but on 
the other circular. It is true that abstract ideas (not 
only numbers, but such notions as happiness, 
democracy, etc.) a priori are opposed to concrete 
objects existing in reality – virtual concepts and 
physical objects possess entirely contrasting 
characteristics. But as to the sphere of mental activity 
the case is absolutely different – representations of all 
objects – both concrete and abstract – are semantic 
entities and exist not in reality but in the mind of an 
individual and their status is equalized. The 
opposition concrete – abstract obviously belongs to 
the sphere of semantics, and it is logical to apply it to 
the content of mental concepts which are considered 
to be the constituents of thoughts [23]: concrete 
concepts replace real objects of the world in the 
mental lexicon while abstract concepts represent non-
existent entities that are products of the mind 
reasoning.  
Nevertheless, when the notion of abstractness is 
discussed in terms of mental activity a lot of 
confusion arises from the very start. Any attempt to 
separate concepts of abstract objects from the 
concepts of concrete ones is groundless as the word 
object cannot be applied in the same sense to 
concepts that are abstract things by default and do not 
exist in reality, are not tangible or within the grasp of 
the senses. Similarly, the word concrete is not fully 
relevant even when applied to concepts of real 
objects which are part of the mental sphere. Concrete 
objects concepts are usually described as equal to the 
objects of reality they represent while they must be 
treated as abstract, too – mental representations 
(including perceptual images) only represent real 
objects in the individual’s mind and are abstract, so 
to say virtual, per se. It follows that when speaking 
about mental processes we should distinguish the 
degree of abstraction that certain mental operations 
deal with. To draw a sharp distinction between the 
abstract and concrete thinking is impossible, and 
there is no need to do that. Even such purely abstract 
concepts as numbers and figures historically are 
linked to concrete notions of “many” and “much” 
that were designated by ancients in drawings of many 
objects, or scores of stones and shells.  
The attempts to explain the peculiarities of 
concrete thinking by the mental operations involved in 
the problem-solving of the here-and-now moment 
reveal only half-truth. A closer observation shows that 
all mental processes are performed in an abstract way, 
even those going on in real time, even those based on 
the so called spatial cognition that involves the 
individual’s physical presence on the particular 
environmental scene. When, for instance, I am 
walking down a path in the forest and see a big tree 
lying in front and blocking my way, I do not pull or 
push the trunk, neither do I try to perform physically 
any other scenarios of the problem-solving so that I 
could choose the best one which is absurd. Instead I 
first observe and estimate the situation: perceive the 
tree and objects around it – the size, the distance, the 
state of the ground on both sides of the path (in case it 
might be swampy or contain some other danger if I 
decide to walk around), my outfit (especially my 
footwear – is it only for walking on dry ground or are 
they rubber-boots?), my physical abilities (how fit I 
am for this or that sort of physical activity – jumping 
or climbing), etc. The listed objects are in front of me, 
they all are real objects but I operate only with their 
mental representations while searching for a solution.  
What is to be noted here is the fact that I do not 
rely entirely on the information perceived on-line. I 
retrieve from my memory similar cases 
epistemologically acquired during my life and use 
them while estimating the present situation. Thus my 
“concrete, spatial” thinking becomes even more 
abstract as it involves all previous cases of my getting 
over different obstacles. It is particularly important 
here that though this sort of problem-solving does not 
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include our linguistic mind it is obviously based on 
the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think 
abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, the ability 
that is usually unjustly accredited only to human 
intelligence (see the definition above). 
The latter circumstance is very important as 
there must be similar processes in the minds of other 
animals. All higher animals when acting in real life 
coordinate their capabilities with situations around 
them relying on the previous experience. Deer, cats 
and other evaluate the distance before jumping 
otherwise the consequences might be fatal. Puppies 
that have been hurt by a hedgehog’s needles will 
avoid further contacts as their memories will warn 
them against that, and when meeting a hedgehog 
again the incoming percepts (auditory, visual and 
olfactory) will evoke impressions of the previous 
contact which will contain the painful tactile 
component. The fact that puppies become cautious 
with all hedgehogs shows that they not only learn 
from experience, but they also develop cognitively 
and are able to classify, sort, order, and organize 
facts: they become aware of the danger that comes 
from all hedgehogs, not a particular one. Definitely it 
will not be an exaggeration to admit that even 
animals’ minds process data of different degree of 
abstract semantics.  
That the problem of the mind origin in its 
different varieties is of particular importance for the 
evolution of life on Earth is addressed in many recent 
publications about proto-forms of mental activity in 
the lowest species [e.g., 26; 24]. In his paper 
presented at the 2012 Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
(Tartu, Estonia) Alexei Sharov writes that the mind 
emergence marks a transition from protosemiosis to 
eusemiosis. He treats mind as a tool for classifying 
and modeling objects which means that mind must be 
much more than just molecular signaling, and its 
origin meant the uncovering of a new threshold zone 
in the semiotic organization in evolving organisms 
[15]. According to Sharov, protosemiosis 
corresponds to the initial level of life origin, i.e. 
origin of agency (action), while eusemiosis marks the 
origin of the mind which he describes as the origin of 
signs/signals that control actions (there must be some 
form of mediation between action and stimulus): “A 
primitive form of mind may exist in a single cell, 
where the nucleus plays the role of the brain. Thus 
multicellular brains in animals are communities of 
cellular ‘minds’ of individual neurons. The ability of 
agents to classify objects may have originated from 
their capacity to distinguish states of their own body 
in order to prioritize various functions” [24, p. 216]. 
Interpretation at this level of communicative 
interaction may mean the ability to choose from a set 
of options the organism confronts with. The author 
sees another important faculty of the mind at this 
primary modeling level of semiosis in the ability to 
anticipate unperceived features of the real world 
(ibid.) which means the presence of abstract mental 
proto-abilities in the microworld. Interpretive 
processes are based on abstraction. The matter of 
choice presupposes operation with abstract notions 
already on the binary opposition principle reducible 
to two main global concepts – good/favourable – 
bad/unfavourable.  
The examples given show that it is certainly 
difficult to single out either abstract or concrete 
thinking as both definitely go together, or, better say, 
that concrete thinking (based on spatial perception) 
should be taken for the lower level of abstraction in 
the mind. Any living system must rely on both during 
its life-term, and what makes the difference is the 
quantity and quality of abstract thinking used by a 
species in problem-solving.  
Abstraction must be always present when a 
living-system interprets data from the environment – 
even on the epistemological level external data 
monitoring includes such processes as comparing and 
valuating for further decision making and action 
taking. Before making a choice, the possible options 
are to be considered – which of them are favorable/ 
useful and which are not. Some degree of 
prognostication is a necessary prerequisite of survival 
in nature, which in its turn means that such or other 
abstract mechanisms of mental operations must be 
present, too. Today the problem of the mind 
emergence has been moved from the level of humans 
and non-human primates to much lower species [3; 
24] because it has become evident that it is 
impossible to explain that highly complex dynamic 
interaction of the living beings if we do not admit the 
existence of some proto-forms of interpretive mental 
activity in practically all forms of earthly life. 
There is no ground to demarcate perceptual and 
conceptual levels of thinking as the tendency with 
evolutionists is. For example, Robert Logan [17] 
categorically claims that brains of hominids were 
similar to other mammal brains which were purely 
percept processors and only language emergence 
made the conceptual thinking possible: “Words 
representing concepts allowed a transition from the 
non-verbal forms of communication and percept 
based thinking of our hominid ancestors to the verbal 
form of communication and the conceptual symbolic 
form of thinking that is characteristic of the human 
mind. Language is both a form of communication and 
an information processing system that permitted the 
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transition from percept based thought to concept-
based thought. The spoken word is the actual medium 
or mechanism by which concepts are expressed or 
represented. The relationship of spoken language and 
conceptual thought is not a linear causal one. 
Language did not give rise to concepts nor did 
concepts give rise to language, rather human speech 
and conceptualization emerged at exactly the same 
point in time creating the conditions for their mutual 
emergence. In a certain sense language and 
conceptual thought self-organized” [17, p. 82]. 
Unfortunately, that approach does not resolve 
the same old hen-first-egg-first problem. No one 
argues that language emergence had definitely 
increased the status of conceptual thinking in humans 
and made it the principal one that is in charge of 
Homo socio-cultural behavior. But neither language 
nor conceptual thinking could have evolved 
simultaneously, or by chance. There had to be some 
preparatory stages on both sides concerning moves in 
growth of distributed semiotic activity and abstract 
forms of thinking that could have enabled the new 
cardinal stage. 
The biosemiotic perspective with its assumption 
that communication via different signs is continuous 
across species, and that biological evolution is not 
complete without evolutionary semiotics 
demonstrates that information processing in various 
animals demands proto-concepts that their minds 
operate when making decisions [26]. Language as a 
means of external and social (sic!) communication 
could have evolved only when the conceptual system 
(mental lexicon) had been formed. It has already been 
shown that the semantics of concepts is not equal to 
the semantics of corresponding words. The latter is 
much narrower as the speaker can externalize 
verbally only part of the sense leaving a lot in 
implication, for instance the nuances of his/her 
emotional state – human psyche is very rich 
semantically at any given moment of life. Each 
human mind is distinctive and singular, and its 
content is always much more affluent compared to 
what a person can show outwardly.  
The view on the mind as distributed activity [1] 
on lower and higher levels of abstraction provides the 
possibility to explain the evolutionary continuity 
across species in terms of the constant increase of 
abstract thinking and mind complexity – the higher 
the class of the animal is the more complex and 
elaborate behavior the latter demonstrates, and the 
more multifaceted interaction it has with the 
environment and other species. Quantitative changes 
lead to a qualitative response giving rise to a new 
mental capacity that is built on top of the already 
existing ones thus forming a hierarchy of the 
organism’s semiotic linkages with the surroundings. 
Transition to a new level of interaction with the 
environment is marked by new forms of higher 
abstract thinking and new semiotic codes acquisition.  
 
Semiotic mind 
The dominance of our species on the planet (if 
we do not to take the microworld into account) is the 
decisive evidence of our uniqueness which is 
associated with two circumstances – human language 
capacity and the celebrated mental abilities. The 
former seems to be an obvious human benefit over 
the rest of the animals as no other biological species 
has ever approached anything similar to human 
verbal communication. Different varieties of 
languages are indispensable in the life of human 
communities and enable interpersonal information 
exchange to the maximum degree that can be found 
nowhere else in the living world. 
Any discussion of human specificity invariably 
includes reasoning on both phenomena, and quite 
often the theorizing reminds of the hermeneutic circle 
– language is explained via mind while mind is 
equated to language. Those close ties between 
language and mind seem to be supported by the fact 
that specifically human thought processes are 
performed with the help of mental verbal 
representations, which means we think in language, 
and language functions in two modes – interior and 
exterior (I-language and E-language in Noam 
Chomsky’s terminology (1986)) thus servicing the 
needs of interpersonal social communication and 
personal auto-communication, the latter can be 
epistemologically traced by everyone in their own 
minds.  
The contemporary evolutionary theory treats 
language emergence as a phenomenon inseparable 
from the formation of the human mind. Purely human 
intelligence is normally identified with the ability to 
think in abstractions, or, in Derek Bickerton’s words 
– to off-think, by which he implies such a mode of 
cognitive processes at which mental operations 
performed with mental representations are not 
influenced by the situation of the given moment and 
can refer to events both of the past and prospective 
future. The ease with which human thoughts flow and 
combine different verbal concepts on the 
combinatorial principles leads to an assumption that 
language and higher-order thinking have always gone 
together and must have evolved at the same time [4].  
Speaking about the evolution of language 
systems in the brain, Terrence Deacon [7] 
differentiates two extreme language selection 
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scenarios that “ are commonly opposed in the 
literature to predict what changes in brain structure 
might be relevant: scenarios assuming that language 
is a consequence (or late-stage tweak) of a more 
prolonged trend toward increasing general 
intelligence (exemplified by a 2 million year 
expansion of brain size) and scenarios assuming that 
language is the consequence of domain-specific 
neural modifications and is independent of general 
intelligence” [7, p. 16]. 
He points out that those scenarios though not 
mutually exclusive, “do make different predictions 
with respect to neural structural and functional 
consequences, as well as evolutionary timing”. In the 
first case language emergence “is likely supported by 
a significant and extended natural selection history, 
including the contributions of many genetic changes 
affecting the brain”. If it is of recent invention, there 
has not been enough time for language functions to 
be more integrated into cognitive abilities. This 
hypothesis is “more consistent with language 
processes being highly modular and domain-specific, 
localized to one or a very few neural systems, fragile 
with respect to brain damage and genetic variation” 
[ibid., p. 16 – 17]. 
It would certainly be logical to accept the 
ancient language origin scenario, but the 
archeological evidence provides arguable evidence 
for that: “The paleoarcheological record is 
surprisingly stable from about 1.6 million years ago 
to roughly 350,000 years ago, with the transition 
from Acheulean to Mousterian tool culture, but 
doesn’t begin to show signs of regional tool styles, 
decorative artifacts, and representational forms (e.g. 
carvings and cave paintings) until roughly 60,000 
years ago, with the dawn of what is called the upper 
Paleolithic culture. This recent transition to 
technological diversity and representational artifacts 
has been attributed to a major change in cognitive 
abilities, which many archeologists speculate reflects 
the appearance of language. Fossil crania, however, 
provide no hint of a major neuroanatomical 
reorganization, and the genetic diversity of modern 
human populations indicates that there are some 
modern human lineages that have been 
reproductively separated from one another for at least 
twice this period and yet all have roughly equivalent 
language abilities. These considerations weigh in 
favor of a protracted evolution of language abilities 
and for the convergence of many diverse neural 
adaptations to support language “[ibid., p.17].  
The sudden cultural explosion in the upper 
Paleolithic period must be an evidence of some really 
important changes in cognitive mechanisms that 
enabled an abrupt increase in cultural artifacts. But 
the fact remains that “Despite decades of research to 
identify the distinctive neuroanatomical substrates 
that provide humans with an unprecedented faculty 
for language, no definitive core of uniquely human 
anatomical correlates has been demonstrated. Only a 
few distinctive anatomical differences can be directly 
associated with the human language adaptation. 
These are associated with the special motor 
adaptations for speech” [ibid., p. 20]. 
The conflict will be resolved if we approach the 
language capacity acquisition from the distributed 
cognition and communication mutuality perspective and 
look upon human mind evolution as gradual increase of 
abstraction due to semiotic competence growth.  
Cognition is inseparable from communicative 
processes, both heavily interdependent: cognition 
being the sum of knowledge that is vitally important 
for the species survival and maintenance, to acquire it 
the organism must develop multimodal mechanisms 
of interactions with the environment. Multifaceted 
communication (sensory-motor with non-humans) 
provides an organism with data that are mutually 
complementary thus enabling the verification of 
information received via one channel through the 
other. In the course of evolution, a dominant sense 
(e.g. sight in humans and primates) and additional 
ones are usually developed. Combinations of senses 
across species are different, and that variability is 
defined by the habitat and the patterns of the species 
behavior that the species constantly diversifies to 
survive and reproduce. The more varied the species 
cognition and communication are the more chances 
for success it has. That statement is circumstantially 
supported by the fact that more cognitively developed 
animals like mammals are fewer in number compared 
to lower species – the risks of the extinction are 
reduced by the input of more diverse data thus 
ensuring the organism’s stability.  
Both cognition and communication are always 
distributed and non-linear. The character of the 
cognitive and communicative networks of a living 
being is extremely complex and highly dynamic. The 
internal vs. external specificity of interaction defines 
the character of cognitive processes. Cognition 
underpins the interactions between species and 
structures their communities.  
Jesper Hoffmeyer [11] writes that practically all 
processes in the animate world are regulated 
communicatively. The environmental pressure on an 
organism is so great that by genes alone it is 
impossible to explain the evolutionary changes a 
species undergoes. It is the ability of living systems 
to ‘read’ signs / signals and interpret them that 
regulates the mechanisms of adjustability to the 
instability of the settings. Thus mind is an inherent 
part of communication and consequently – of 
semiotic processes. The more diverse a species 
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interaction with the world is the more complex 
mental activity it has, the richer its semioticon is the 
higher abstract operations the mind performs. 
Language is only one of the communicative means 
used in modern human cultures and to use it 
successfully well-developed mechanisms of 
abstraction are needed. Before language was acquired 
the mind had to be prepared for it through different 
communication practices via different signs.  
Both thinking (information processing) and 
communication (information exchange) are 
dependent on data, and both can be better described 
as two sides of the same process. From the 
evolutionary perspective most probably not mind and 
language but mind and semiotic competence co-
evolved. The survival of individuals in the biological 
world is impossible in isolation from the 
environment, and the latter provides every organism 
with huge masses of info non-stop. No wonder both 
capacities undeniably go together and co-influence 
each other, but still there is one great distinction 
between the two.  
Thinking is an interior phenomenon, its 
processes are hidden behind the skull from the 
outside observer, and he/ she can only deduce what 
thoughts have preceded the actions performed by the 
individual under observation. As to communication, 
most of its forms (except internal processes) are 
externalized. The physical integrity itself of a living 
being rests on the interaction with animate and 
inanimate objects around it. Thus the more 
exhaustive and detailed data it gets the more verified 
the understanding of the situation a species has. The 
constant needs in extra data under the pressure of the 
changing environment initiate changes in the 
biological structure of the organism enabling its 
successful adaptation.  
The semantic component is crucial for any 
communicative act for it is the content, or meaning, 
that both the addresser and the addressee are in need 
of. The multiple forms of external communicative 
interaction that have developed in the course of 
evolution must have emerged under the pressure of: 
1) urgent need in meaningful information, and 2) 
completeness and full value of the received message. 
The latter must have always been the matter of 
particular concern – if losses of information in the 
course of interaction were too big, the interaction 
itself would lead to a failure. Thus the search for the 
most reliable operational mode and channel that 
would ensure the least possible losses of semantics 
must have accompanied biological evolution. As a 
result, the higher the species the more complex and 
multifaceted external communicative capacity it has 
(behavioral patterns, gestures, vocal signals, spotting, 
``etc.). That shows that one channel of information 
transfer and delivery is never enough, and species 
have developed extra pathways that would make a 
species information safety more stable.  
David Kirsh [14] points to one more demand 
that had to contribute to communicative forms 
development and precision – the search for means of 
reducing the cost of information exchange. Though 
Kirsh writes about the ways external representations 
enhance human cognitive power, it is plausible that 
the cost reducing issue is relevant for all forms of 
biological communication. The best ways of 
information delivery and transfer are to be the 
quickest and energy saving to give a species a chance 
to withstand the environmental threats.    
The organism’s links with the surroundings are 
plentiful, its different biological systems establish their 
own forms of intercourse with the outside providing the 
body which is a complex integral system with separate 
flows of data that are to be compared, verified and 
generalized by its subsystems first, and the results must 
be amalgamated by the central controller then to create 
an overview of the situation.  
External forms of communicative interaction can 
be performed in two modes: on-line and off-line. The 
on-line communication is a model of dynamic 
interaction in the real-time mode (all communicants 
function in the same system of time-and-space 
coordinates, interact directly and process information 
spontaneously) ‘here and now” on the principle of 
analogue coding. Signs used by the interacting 
organisms are ‘mapped’ on their bodies as they 
communicate via voiced signals, postures and other 
bodily movements. In the situation of constant scene 
changing, immediate interaction demands 
spontaneous reaction (stimulus–response principle) to 
the received signal (figure). Space domineers in the 
situation and all components of the scene (ground) 
are revealed to the perceiving mind. The interacting 
organisms receive all sorts of the background data 
through their senses non-stop simultaneously, and 
they share the same data. The time span is irrelevant; 
the semantically rich background information of the 
moment is most significant and defines the character 
of the spontaneous discourse. On-line intercourse is 
based on the lower-level mental abstraction, and the 
semantic memory plays a less important role than the 
operational and the episodic types of memory.  
In the off-line intercourse communicants are 
distanced in time and space, they can neither see nor 
hear each other while generating or receiving a 
message. That type is basically autonomous as the 
addresser, the message and the addressee are separated 
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from each other. Cases of that communicative mode are 
scarce in nature, spotting known best of all, but they 
have been growing increasingly important in human 
societies uniting separated groups of communities and 
even generations by providing them with the 
accumulated knowledge of their ancestors. Thus the off-
line social communication is time-oriented, and both 
external analog and symbolic sign systems are used to 
code. The total sum of cultural artifacts, practices, 
rituals, beliefs and patterns of social behavior constitute 
the cooperative external social memory of humans. 
These signs are not “mapped” on organisms’ bodies, 
they are invented to pass the information from inside 
out and extend the biological memory of humans. That 
extension of an individual biological memory to the 
social collective one provided enormous possibilities for 
our species development as it made it possible to store, 
give access to and pass on to other generations huge, 
practically limitless, masses of info.  
Cognitive specificity on-line and off-line types 
of communication can be described as follows:  
Biological cognitive processes are internally 
distributed, embodied (local) and dynamic: they are 
continuous and the results of mental processing are 
used for short-term goals – on-line interaction. 
Social cognitive processes with humans are 
externally distributed, disembodied (non-local) and 
static: externalized results are discrete units of 
knowledge that are fossilized and used for long-term 
goals– off-line interaction. 
Off-line communicative interaction has become 
decisive for human evolution [2] bringing into 
existence mind-sharing [8] capacities in human 
societies. It is this off-line communication (not 
necessarily including the verbal component) that 
demands higher forms of abstraction and easily copes 
with social conventions not rooted in nature. 
Diversification of external sign systems relevant for 
communal survival gave rise to the human 
unprecedented abstract thinking. 
 
Conclusion 
Survival of any species no matter how complex 
is ensured by both concrete and abstract information, 
and the more complex the living system the more 
efficiently it operates abstract models derived from 
the interpretation of different flows of data provided 
by its different subsystems. The differences in the 
complexity of various species biological structures of 
natural kingdoms can be probably described in terms 
of the varying levels they have in communicative 
competence and cognitive abilities. Cognition is 
distributed but so is communication. It will not be an 
exaggeration to say that evolution itself should be 
looked upon as a continuing increase in 
communicative competence which inevitably 
upgrades the interpreting abilities of the mind.  
The biosemiotic approach helps to see that all 
forms of cognition, beginning with the biologically 
ingrained, are distributed as different perceptual 
channels of information delivery are needed to verify 
the in-coming data. Different forms of 
communicative interaction that are mapped on the 
organism’s body demand specific cognitive structures 
to extract, analyze and generalize the information to 
adjust the body behavior to the on-line 
circumstances. The most essential data acquired 
through the life-term are stored for future, and each 
individual database is the personal knowledge of how 
to survive. Therefore, even in terms of spatial life 
spontaneity all species are dependent of different 
forms of mental abstraction: initial perceptual 
imagery (of iconic and indexical character) and 
generalized mental imagery stored in the memory. 
That lower-level mental abstraction turns out to be 
quite efficient for the survival of a species as closed 
system. The results of the internal cognitive 
processes are not necessarily externalized to be put to 
use by other organisms. 
Biologically distributed environmental forms of 
cognition are backed up by interpersonal social forms 
of interaction and amplified with socially distributed 
cognition. Socially relevant forms of communication 
need convention that is why externalizing personal 
knowledge and adapting to collective intelligence 
become a prerequisite for social groups.  
Off-line communication launched more 
generative processes in the mind that enabled 
combinatory links between percepts and mental 
images of more complex situations. It increased the 
capacity for off-line / higher-abstraction thinking. 
Off-line communication is always mediated by 
specific sign systems that are artificially created and 
are loaded with symbolic meaning – meaning that is 
not derived from natural existence epistemologically 
but is conventionally established in human societies. 
That social pressure led to the development of 
higher-order abstraction. 
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